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1 Introduction
The regulation of public and private utilities changed significantly over the last sev-
eral decades as new ideas and paradigms were developed and dismissed (Crew and
Kleindorfer 2002). However, privatization and/or regulation with an appropriate form
of incentive regulation are widely considered to be appropriate policy responses, as for
example demonstrated by the privatization and subsequent regulation of water utilities
in England and Wales, and the establishment of incentive regulation regimes, despite
the retention of public ownership, for many Australian water utilities. For a particu-
lar sector, the transition from one regulatory model to another also involves heated
debates, which can create instability in the regulated sector that in turn influences
economic profits, investments, firm performance and prices (Parker 1999).
In this paper, we consider the case of the publicly owned Dutch drinking water
sector, which experienced several regulatory initiatives over the period between 1992
and 2006. However, this regulatory reform process ultimately resulted in the retention
of public ownership and the implementation of a light-handed sunshine regulation
regime in 1997. In the Dutch water sector, sunshine regulation corresponds to an
application of benchmarking (i.e., a comparison of utilities) in which the outcome
of the benchmarking exercise is made publicly available so as to embarrass the least
performing entities and to put the best performing entities into the limelight (in contrast
to yardstick competition which uses the benchmark results to set maximum prices or
revenues). The Dutch drinking water sector therefore provides an interesting example
where privatisation and the establishment of a mandatory incentive regulation regime
were considered, but ultimately rejected in favour of an alternative approach.
The debate on reforming the Dutch drinking water utilities is also part of a broader
debate among both academics and practitioners (Bauer 2005). The literature focuses
especially on the privatization issue, regulatory problems (e.g., Ugaz and Price 2003)
or institutional structures (e.g., Spiller and Tommasi 2004). Although connected to
this branch of the literature, the focus of the current analysis is on the performance
effects arising from a system that relies on the voluntary publication of perfor-
mance indicators, while imposing no formal regulatory link between relative per-
formance and prices.
We therefore analyze performance change using an input-oriented non-parametric
profit decomposition variant of the approach developed by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell
(1999, 2008). This approach allows us to decompose changes in economic profits,
and thereby identify the relationship between the economic opportunity cost of pro-
ducing water services and the revenues raised by water utilities. While our profit
decomposition analysis largely follows the lead of Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999), we
nonetheless substantially extend their underlying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
efficiency model to a more advanced input-oriented non-parametric model, and there-
fore highlight the following three extensions that should improve the reliability of the
underlying efficiency estimates. Firstly, by implementing robust order-m efficiency
estimates (Cazals et al. 2002) we employ a DEA model which should reduce the
influence of atypical observations. The latter could arise from (1) measurement errors,
(2) the various mergers in the sector or (3) wrongly estimated values due to the use
of data that adheres to accounting rules (e.g., Taylor 1999; Salvary 2003). Secondly,
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we employ Daraio and Simar (2007) approach to further extend the robust order-m
model to incorporate heterogeneity in the efficiency analysis. We thereby account for
the exogenous environment of the drinking water utilities by controlling for popu-
lation density, which is widely considered to be an important determinant of water
utility input requirements (see Filippini et al. 2008). We therefore obtain more reliable
profit decomposition results than would be obtained if we ignored such differences in
operating environment. Thirdly, by using a window analysis technique, we allow for
the possibility of both technical regress and progress in the model, thereby allowing
better estimation of efficient input requirements in any given year.
As our below results demonstrate, our adaptation of Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell’s
approach allows a detailed analysis of how factors such as (1) output and input prices,
(2) productivity, and (3) changes in the structure of firms, such as, their resource mix
and scale have influenced profitability in the sector, and how consumers have, or have
not benefited from these changes. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that substantial
performance improvements appear to have been obtained from the introduction of sun-
shine regulation for Dutch drinking water utilities, and despite the ultimate rejection
of privatization and strict incentive regulation regime with binding price caps.
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review developments
in the Dutch drinking water sector over the past two decades. Section 3 presents the
input-oriented profit decomposition model while Sect. 4 outlines the methodology for
estimating the unobserved quantities which are required for the profit decomposition.
Section 5 discusses the particular application and its results. In the final section we
offer our conclusions.
2 The development of the Dutch drinking water sector
Since the early 1990s, the Dutch drinking water sector has experienced an extended
period of debate with regard to its structure and regulatory model. In the 1992–2006
period, there were various debates between advocates and opponents of privatization
and strict regulation. However, ultimately the sector has remained in public ownership
and has been regulated since 1997 with a relatively light-handed sunshine regulation
system. While this system has resulted in the publication of benchmarking reports
based on 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006 data, these benchmarking exercises do not result
in the implementation of formal price regulation. Our below analysis will therefore
consider the sources of profit change in the pre sunshine period 1992–1997, the entire
post sunshine period 1997–2006, and the sub periods 1997–2000, 2000–2003, and
2003–2006 as defined by the years in which public benchmarking was performed. By
analyzing several sector publications (mainly Waterspiegel published by the Asso-
ciation of Dutch Water Companies (Vewin), the annual accounts of the utilities and
opinion articles in the Dutch financial press), we can briefly describe developments in
the Dutch drinking water sector during these periods. However, we also note that after
the introduction of sunshine regulation in 1997, regulatory policy and industry trends
are more consistent, with only relatively minor variation between the sub periods.
This section does not intend to exhaustively describe the history of the Dutch drinking
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water sector (see Kuks 2006; Van Dijk et al. 2007), but rather it summarizes changes
in and debates about its structure and regulatory model.
2.1 The pre sunshine period: 1992–1997
By the beginning of the 1990s the Dutch government implemented privatization and
liberalization in several network sectors (e.g., the telecommunication and energy sec-
tors). However, the water industry remained an unreformed public sector utility, where
for example prices were insufficient to cover economic costs. Thus, in 1992, by our
calculations (details are provided below in Sect. 5), the companies made aggregate real
(in 1995 prices) economic losses of 97.6 million euros, as revenues were not sufficient
to cover economic costs. However, given the anticipated privatization of the water sec-
tor, efforts were made to improve the financial strength of the drinking water utilities
by increasing consumer prices. As a result, by 1995 the industry became economi-
cally profitable and by 1997 it had achieved profits of 139.5 million euros. However,
while this increase in consumer prices restored the financial viability of the utilities,
by 1997, a government report stated a clear relationship between the monopolistic
provision of drinking water and its high costs and prices. The report’s authors argued
that the introduction of incentive regulation would reduce water prices by at least 7%
(Dijkgraaf et al. 1997). However, despite this analysis, as well as the sector’s finan-
cial preparation for privatisation, there was in fact insufficient political support in the
mid 1990s for the government to be able to actually implement privatisation and/or
an incentive regulation system. Given this political reality, policy makers sought a
policy response that would allow for efficiency improvements while retaining public
ownership, in at least the interim before future potential privatisation.
2.2 The post sunshine period: 1997–2006
2.2.1 The period 1997–2000
The Dutch drinking water sector organization Vewin was strongly opposed to any
idea of strict incentive regulation. However, thanks to political pressures to increase
transparency and efficiency in the sector and in order to avoid privatization which
might become necessary without efficiency improvements (following the English and
Welsh utilities), in 1997 Vewin started a voluntary benchmarking scheme which was
used for sunshine regulation (Waterspiegel 2001).
The effectiveness of Dutch sunshine regulation depends on both internal and exter-
nal carrots and sticks. Internal incentives arrive from increased transparency, the
diffusion of best practices by sector-specific workshops, improved knowledge of pri-
orities in the company and financial rewards for managers if they are able to improve
the utility’s position in the sunshine ranking. The drinking water utilities’ annual
accounts also explicitly set targets detailing their desired performance (e.g., a place
in the top-three on all benchmarked issues). External incentives are driven by public
interest in the water sector as the media heavily report the sunshine results. In addition,
the water companies are owned by the provincial and municipal governments which in
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turn are elected by the citizens in the service area of the utility. As is common practice
in the Netherlands, in the remainder of the text we will use the terms of ‘sunshine
regulation’ and ‘benchmarking’ as equivalents.
The Vewin benchmark is implemented in a three year cycle. In the first two years
only costs are compared, and these results are only internally published among the
drinking water utilities. However, in the third year an external ‘benchmark’ is generated
which provides figures and rankings on factors such as quality, service, environmental
issues and costs. The first public benchmark considered 1997 data and was published
in March 1999. The second public benchmark analysed 2000 data and was published
in November 2001. The third issue uses 2003 data, and was published in November
2004, while the latest version employs 2006 data and was published in September
2007.
Several academic studies have considered the development of cost efficiency in the
Dutch drinking water sector and suggest that the sunshine regulatory system has led to
improvements in the cost performance of the sector (Kuks 2006; Dijkgraaf et al. 2007a;
De Witte and Dijkgraaf 2008). Thus, while water quality and service levels steadily
increased, the sector also experienced a considerable increase in cost efficiency of
23% between 1997 and 2006. Increased transparency and political pressures to gain
scale economies by creating a single drinking water company in each province also
led to intensified merger activity from 1996 onwards, and as a result, the number of
drinking water companies halved between 1992 and 2007. However, while potential
scale economy benefits have been the justification for these mergers, recent empirical
work finds no evidence to support the accrual of scale economy benefits from these
mergers (De Witte and Dijkgraaf 2008). Conversely, by decreasing the number of
reference observations in the benchmark, the mergers may have reduced the potential
effectiveness of benchmarking in identifying underperformance. Our below analysis
will also shed further light on the benefits gained through improved efficiency and
scale changes, while also integrating these effects into a more robust analysis of the
determinants of the sector’s overall productivity and profit performance.
2.2.2 The period 2000–2003
After the publication of the first two benchmarking reports, a policy debate with regard
to the ownership of the water utilities began once again in the Dutch parliament. How-
ever, in 2003, after two years of discussions, the continued lack of sufficient political
support for privatisation, and prompted by positive results from the sunshine regulation
regime, the Dutch parliament reserved the drinking water sector as a public domain,
which implied a moratorium on private investments. The Dutch drinking water utilities
therefore continue to be structured as Public Limited Companies (PLCs) in which the
provinces and municipalities own the assets. It is notable that the provinces are also
responsible for regulating drinking water tariffs and, therefore, potential conflicts in
interest may arise. For all utilities but one, the shareholders’ meeting can decide on
the payment of a dividend to the shareholders (i.e., the provinces and municipalities).
Some utilities decided not to return a dividend, whereas other opted for one percent
point above the 10-year guild bond, still others return up to 57% of the profits to the
shareholders (for an overview on all utilities, see Dijkgraaf et al. 2007b).
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In addition to discussing the ownership of the water utilities, during this period
the government also proposed a new law which would have applied a formal system
of yardstick competition to the sector. However, the idea of establishing yardstick
competition was finally buried in early 2004 when a new Minister took office.
2.2.3 The period 2003–2006
In this period critical articles began to appear in the press emphasizing ‘excessive’
profits, and as a result, public awareness and concerns regarding profits in the water
sector increased. Our below analysis of economic profitability, demonstrates the cause
of this increased concern as in our sample of firms real (in 1995 prices) aggregate
economic profits increased from 146.6 million euros in 2002 to 241.3 million eu-
ros in 2005. As a response, the sector stressed that until 2000 drinking water prices
increased more than the consumer price index (CPI), but from 2000 onwards drink-
ing water prices increased less than CPI. However, given that economic profits in
the industry remain very high relative to their level in the early 1990s, it is clear
that these below inflation increases in water prices have not substantially eroded
the high levels of economic profitability achieved in the sector. Moreover, as pro-
vincial governments are the ultimate beneficiaries of these high economic profits, it
would appear that water tariffs are now set above economic costs, which implies
that water consumers implicitly subsidize other government activities. This is in
stark contrast to the situation in 1992, when the presence of economic losses sug-
gests that Dutch water consumers did not pay the full economic cost of their water
usage.
In sum, our review suggests that the Dutch drinking water sector provides a some-
what unusual example that warrants careful analysis. This is the case, because the
industry has undergone substantial mergers and adopted a new regulatory regime,
despite the fact that it has not been privatized. Moreover, it has dramatically increased
its profitability, which previous papers and general policy debate suggest may be
attributable to improved efficiency/productivity and/or substantial increases in water
prices for consumers. Given this, it is interesting to look behind the profit change by
decomposing it into its underlying drivers. Moreover, by linking changes in profit-
ability and its drivers to regulatory and structural changes that have occurred over
the 1992–2006 period, we can better understand the drivers of performance in the
Dutch drinking water industry, and contribute to the current policy debate with regard
to the appropriateness of regulation and prices in the Dutch water industry. The two
proceeding sections therefore develop a non-parametric model that will allow us to
do this.
3 Decomposing profit change
Consider n utilities which are using p heterogeneous and non-negative inputs x
(x1, . . . , x p) to produce q heterogeneous and non-negative outputs y (y1, . . . , yq ).
The utilities buy inputs at input prices w (w1, . . . , wp) and sell outputs at out-
put prices p (p1, . . . , pq ), which could be either exogenously or endogenously
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determined. Economic profits π t in time period t (t = 1, . . . , T ) are determined
as total revenues minus total economic costs:
π t =
q∑
m=1
ptm y
t
m −
p∑
l=1
wtl x
t
l (1)
where in the remainder of the article we will drop the subscripts and consider the
variables as vectors. In their interesting contributions, Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999,
2008) look at the change in economic profits between two time periods and decom-
pose this profit change into its drivers. In this section, we present the complemen-
tary input-oriented analytical model to the original output-oriented decomposition
of Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999).1 Firstly, consider the decomposition of the profit
change between period t + 1 and period t into a quantity and a price effect:
π t+1 − π t =
[(
yt+1 − yt
)
pt −
(
xt+1 − xt
)
wt
]
+
[(
pt+1 − pt
)
yt+1 −
(
wt+1 − wt
)
xt+1
]
. (2)
The quantity effect (i.e., the first term in squared brackets) measures for constant base
period prices the impact on profit change arising from the change in outputs relative
to the change in inputs. As such, it measures the performance of the evaluated entity,
while eliminating input and output price fluctuations. The price effect (i.e., the second
term in squared brackets) estimates, for a fixed reference basket, the impact of input
and output price fluctuations on profit change between period t and t + 1.
We enrich the profit decomposition by allowing for relative inefficiencies (i.e.,
relative to the set of best practice observations; see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1999).
Analyzing inefficiencies requires an assumption on the efficiency measurement ori-
entation. We will focus on the input-orientation (i.e., minimizing input usage for a
given set of outputs) as this is the most natural in our empirical application. Thus,
we assume that drinking water utilities should try to reduce their input usage given
their level of drinking water production. Allowing for inefficiencies, profit change can
now be driven by increases in productivity or by improvements in the activity mix (all
expressed in base period prices). This can be seen by further decomposing the quantity
effect as follows:
(
yt+1 − yt
)
pt −
(
xt+1 − xt
)
wt =
[(
xt − x A
)
wt −
(
xt+1 − xC
)
wt
+
(
x A − x B
)
wt
]
+
[(
yt+1 − yt
)
pt −
(
xC − x B
)
wt
]
. (3)
The first term in squared brackets is referred to as the productivity effect, but can
be further decomposed as the sum of the impact on profit change resulting from
(1) the evaluated entity’s efficiency improvement relative to the best practice fron-
tier (i.e., the difference between the first two terms) and (2) technical progress (if
1 The recent contribution of Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2008) discusses a particular variant of the input-ori-
ented framework.
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Fig. 1 Input efficient boundaries
x A − x B > 0) or technical regress (if x A − x B < 0) between period t and t + 1.
The former component is denoted as the efficiency change (or catch-up effect), while
the latter component is labeled as technical change. An increase in efficiency has
a positive influence on profit change, as does technical progress. Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell (1999) argue that the input-oriented efficiency scores (θ ) of a non-parametric
model, which measure excessive input use for a given output set without assuming
an a priori specification on the production function, can be used to deduce the unob-
served inputs x A, x B and xC as, respectively, θ t (xt , yt ) ∗ xt , θ t+1(xt , yt ) ∗ xt and
θ t+1(xt+1, yt+1) ∗ xt+1 (i.e., the radial projection of xt and xt+1 on to the respective
frontier). While the practical computation of θ is explored in the next section, Fig. 1
illustrates the relationship between x A, x B , xC , xt and xt+1 for a two-dimensional
input vector.
The second term in squared brackets is the activity effect, which captures the impact
on profit change arising from shifts in the firm’s activities, as measured by changes in
output and input levels evaluated using constant base period prices. Decomposing the
activity effect further reveals that its components capture the impact on profitability
of changes in scale and scope between period t and t + 1.
To illustrate this decomposition of the activity effect consider again Fig. 1, as well
as Fig. 2. In Fig. 1, the efficient input boundary Ct+1(yt ) indicates the minimum input
requirements to produce a given output level yt using the best practice technology
available in t + 1. To produce efficiently the base period output level yt in the refer-
ence period t + 1, x B inputs are needed. Subsequently increasing the outputs to yt+1,
but holding the input mix constant, requires x D inputs. The difference between x B
and x D therefore reflects the input scale effect.
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Fig. 2 Output efficient boundaries
The output scale effect is visualized in Fig. 2 with two outputs y1 and y2 on the
axes. The output correspondence set Pt+1(x B) measures the maximum obtainable
outputs which are producible by the best practice technology in t + 1 and the input
level x B . Increasing the inputs to the level of x D , but holding the output mix the same
as at yt , the output scale effect is measured as yE − yt .
From Fig. 1, for a given production of outputs in reference period t +1, we can infer
the shift in input use from base period t to reference period t + 1. This is visualized
by the difference between the efficient input level for producing yt+1 (but holding
the input mix similar as in the base period) and the efficient input level xC in t + 1.
The obtained difference x D − xC is the resource mix effect. Similarly, in Fig. 2 the
product mix effect is the shift in outputs from yE to yt+1.
Together, the resource mix (first term in Eq. 4), the product mix (second term) and
the scale effects (difference between the last two terms) constitute the activity effect:
(
yt+1 − yt
)
pt −
(
xC − x B
)
wt
=
(
x D − xC
)
wt −
(
yE − yt+1
)
pt +
(
x B − x D
)
wt −
(
yt − yE
)
pt . (4)
The unobserved inputs x D and outputs yE can be obtained from, respectively, ineffi-
ciency relative to the efficient input requirement frontier θ t+1(xt , yt+1) ∗ xt and the
inefficiency relative to the efficient output correspondence frontier λt+1(x D, yt ) ∗ yt .
In the next section, we therefore demonstrate how to estimate these inefficiencies
without any a priori assumptions with regard to the production technology, and while
allowing for noise and heterogeneity in the data.
123
K. De Witte, D. S. Saal
4 Non-parametrically estimating efficient quantities
To decompose profit change into technical change, efficiency change, product mix,
resource mix, scale and price effects, unobserved quantities x A, x B , xC , x D and yE
have to be deduced. These can be obtained by linking the inefficiency estimates to the
observed quantities (xt , yt ) and (xt+1, yt+1). To estimate the inefficiencies, Grifell-
Tatjé and Lovell (1999, 2008) suggest a sequential DEA model to recover the unob-
served quantities from observed input–output combinations. We further develop their
approach by employing a non-parametric DEA model (see Sect. 4.1) which allows
for uncertainty in the data (Sect. 4.2) and which takes into account heterogeneity in
the sample (Sect. 4.3). The latter is particularly important because it restricts the DEA
model so that a particular observation’s efficiency score is based on a comparison with
other similar observations, and as such, should provide more appropriate efficiency
scores, and hence more meaningful profit decompositions. The model is constructed
step by step in the following subsections.
4.1 DEA in panel data
To evaluate the efficiency of entities, several techniques have been proposed. In
this section, we concentrate on a DEA (Charnes et al. 1978) model which esti-
mates inefficiency relative to a best practice frontier (for an extensive descrip-
tion of DEA, we refer to Fried et al. 2008). Although DEA does not assume
any a priori specification of the production function, it relies on two presump-
tions which are easily defendable in the application under study. In particular, it
assumes free disposability of the inputs and outputs: ∀(xt , yt ) ∈  t , if x˜ t ≥ xt
and y˜t ≤ yt then (x˜ t , y˜t ) ∈  t [where  t denotes the production technology set:
 t = {(xt , yt )|xt ∈ Rp+, yt ∈ Rq+, (xt , yt ) is feasible
}], or stated verbally: if a partic-
ular input–output combination (xt , yt ) is feasible, it should also be possible to produce
yt with more inputs and to produce less outputs with a given input set xt . In addition
to the free disposability assumption, DEA assumes a convex shape for the frontier: if
(xt1, y
t
1), (x
t
2, y
t
2) ∈  t , then ∀α ∈ [0, 1]: (xt , yt ) = α(xt1, yt1)+(1−α)(xt2, yt2) ∈  t .
As such, the corresponding best practice production set is defined as a convex hull of
the undominated input–output combinations:
 tDEA =
{(
xt , yt
) ∈ Rp+q+ |xt ≥
∑n
i=1 γi x
t
i , y
t ≤
∑n
i=1 γi y
t
i , for (γ1, . . . , γn),
s.t.
∑n
i=1 γi = 1, γi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
}
. (5)
The relative input-oriented inefficiencies, θ(x, y), which minimize inputs for a given
output, and output-oriented inefficiencies, λ(x, y), which maximize outputs for given
inputs, are obtained by determining the appropriate distance to this best practice fron-
tier (see Fried et al. 2008 for further details).
In order to adapt the DEA estimators to a panel data set, we use a Window Analysis
technique (e.g., Fried et al. 2008). A window analysis operates in a panel sample by the
principle of moving averages so that an observation is evaluated against all entities in
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its ‘window’ (i.e., the reference set is enlarged to include observations from different
years). By using window analysis we allow for both technical progress and regress,
which is not the case in the sequential DEA analysis of Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999,
2008). In the current application, we assume a window size equal to 3 years and limit
the scope of the window to the past. This corresponds to the evaluation of the reference
period (i.e., t or t + 1) and the two proceeding years.2 As such, we can obtain the
efficiency scores θ t (xt , yt ) and λt (xt , yt ) needed for the profit decomposition.
4.2 Allowing for uncertainty in the data
However, a major disadvantage of the traditional DEA model lies in its deterministic
nature as it assumes that all observations (xti , yti ) belong to the production set of size
n, i.e., Prob((xti , y
t
i ) ∈  t ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. As such, atypical or outlying
observations could bias the estimates if they dramatically influence the best practice
frontier.
To reduce the influence of atypical observations, Cazals et al. (2002) suggests esti-
mating efficiency relative to a partial best practice frontier constituted from m < n
observations, instead of estimating the efficiency relative to the full best practice fron-
tier constituted from all n observations. For the evaluated observation (xt , yt ) this
so-called robust order-m approach draws for the input or output-orientation a sample
of size m with replacement, respectively, among those xti so that y
t ≤ yti or among
those yti so that x
t ≥ xti . For the obtained sub-sample, the non-parametric model is
then computed. After repeating the sampling and efficiency evaluation B times, the
robust efficiency scores θ t,m(xt , yt ) and λt,m(xt , yt ) are obtained by taking the arith-
metic average of the B inefficiencies. Given this approach, the partial frontier will
shift inwards relatively to the full frontier (i.e.,  t ⊂  t,m) such that θ t,m ≥ θ t and
λt,m ≤ λt , (see Daraio and Simar 2007 for details on the practical implementation of
this robust order-m DEA approach).
As the evaluated observation does not constitute its reference set in every of the B
drawings, robust DEA estimation can potentially result in ‘super-efficient’ efficiency
scores (i.e., θ t,m > 1 or λt,m < 1). However, as ‘super-efficiency’ is inconsistent with
the profit decomposition framework, these super-efficient observations will result in
biased profit decomposition estimates. We therefore adopt the common practice in the
traditional DEA framework, and treat any super-efficient observation as efficient (i.e.,
we set any θ t,m > 1 or λt,m < 1 equal to 1).
Following Daraio and Simar (2007), the size of the partial frontier m and the number
of resamplings B is determined as the value for which the number of super-efficient
observations decreases only marginally by further increasing m or B (i.e., the per-
centage of points outside  t is practically constant). In our analysis, we determined
m = 50 and B = 300.
Robust order-m DEA estimates are attractive for several reasons. Firstly, they reduce
the influence of atypical and outlying observations. In our particular application, we
2 To test the robustness of this assumption, we experimented with window sizes ranging from 2 to 6 years
and found similar results.
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need to account for outlying observations as these could arise from (1) measurement
errors, (2) the impact of mergers or (3) wrongly estimated values due to particular
accounting rules. Indeed, as annual accounts are not particularly designed for eco-
nomic analysis, the (industrial economics) literature argues that one should account
for this by carefully constructing appropriate input variables (e.g., Taylor 1999; Salvary
2003). The influence of any such atypical observations is reduced by order-m estima-
tion. Secondly, by estimating efficiency relatively to a partial frontier (m < n), the
robust estimation technique reduces the sample size bias which could arise from the
window analysis approach (for a simulation, see De Witte and Marques 2008). Indeed,
Zhang and Bartels (1998) indicate that with standard DEA individual and average effi-
ciency decreases as the number of observations in the sample increases. This issue is
mostly neglected in DEA applications. Finally, the order-m procedure can easily be
extended to conditional efficiency measures which incorporate heterogeneity in the
estimates, and we turn to this issue in the next subsection.
4.3 Taking into account heterogeneity
While the order-m DEA approach allows for uncertainty, it still assumes that all obser-
vations are evaluated against the same frontier constructed from the overall best prac-
tices in the subsample of size m. However, this is a rather blunt approach as there
might arise significant heterogeneity among observations. Some observations could
operate in a favorable (unfavorable) environment which acts as a substitutive input
(output) and, thus, increases (decreases) the efficiency scores. However, it is generally
appropriate to control for differences in operating environment and therefore compare
only comparable (defined as having comparable exogenous characteristics) entities. To
take into account the operational environment non-parametrically, Cazals et al. (2002)
and Daraio and Simar (2005); Daraio and Simar (2007) propose an extension of the
order-m DEA approach that effectively compares like with likes. This is implemented
by conditioning on the environmental variable zti .
The robust and conditional efficiencies are obtained by adapting the previously
outlined order-m sampling procedure as follows. For each of the B draws, the ref-
erence sample of size m is drawn with replacement and with a probability K ((zt −
zti )/h)/
∑n
j=1 K ((zt − zti )/h) among those xti such that yti ≥ yt for the input-orien-
tation, or among those yti such that x
t
i ≤ xt for the output-orientation; where K (·)
denotes a Kernel function. Relative to these environment-adjusted reference samples,
we then proceed as discussed in the preceding sub-sections: we first estimate the input
or output-oriented efficiency model relatively to the reference sample; then re-do this B
times; and finally average the B efficiency evaluations to obtain the robust conditional
efficiency estimate θ t,m(xt , yt |zt ) and λt,m(xt , yt |zt ).
In the remainder of this article, we will focus on these robust conditional
DEA estimates constructed in a window analysis. To compute by this model the
unobserved quantities x A = θ t,m (xt , yt |zt) ∗ xt ; x B = θ t+1,m(xt , yt |zt ) ∗ xt ;
xC = θ t+1,m(xt+1, yt+1|zt+1) ∗ xt+1; x D = θ t+1,m(xt , yt+1|zt+1) ∗ xt and yE =
λt+1,m(x D, yt |zt ) ∗ yt , both the evaluated observation and the period of its refer-
ence observations have to be adapted accordingly in the outlined model. In the next
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section, we apply the resulting robust conditional efficiency estimates to compute the
unobserved quantities in a profit decomposition of the Dutch drinking water utilities.
5 Profits and productivity in the Dutch drinking water sector
As indicated in Sect. 2, the introduction of sunshine regulation was an important land-
mark in the reform of the Dutch drinking water sector. In this section, we empirically
explore its effect on utility performance by decomposing profit change into its drivers.
We first describe the data before continuing with the empirical results.
The panel data set consists of water only companies in the period 1992–2006. All
data are obtained from annual accounts, sector publications by Vewin and the peri-
odic benchmark reports. To control for the impact of inflation, all monetary values are
expressed in thousands of 1995 euros (using the CPI of the Dutch Office for Statistics,
Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek). Our sample consists of a set of 19 water utilities in
1992, and all these firms or the successor firms that resulted from mergers between
them in subsequent years. Therefore, while the number of firms declines to only 10 in
2006, the geographic coverage of the firms represented in the sample remains the same,
although we do note that in 2003 a merger occurred between a firm in our sample and
an extremely small firm not previously represented in the sample. Therefore, with only
this minor exception, comparisons based on aggregate changes in our sample across
time provide a consistent estimate of trends in the sector. Moreover, to investigate the
underlying dynamics in the sector as well as possible, we did not exclude mergers
from the sample (as, Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1999 does). Instead, to allow for profit
change decomposition after mergers, we construct a ‘merged’ firm for year t − 1 as
the sum of the data for the predecessor firms that are subsequently combined in year
t . By doing so, we can estimate profit changes between year t − 1 (i.e., the merged
utility constructed from its predecessor) and t (when data from the newly merged firm
is available).3
In our analysis we follow Eq. 1 to construct a measure of economic profits at time
t (π t ) as turnover (Rt = ∑qm=1 ptm ytm
)
less total economic costs
(
Ct = ∑pl=1 wtl x tl
)
.
Calculation of economic profits and hence profit change therefore requires appropri-
ate data on observed output (ytm) and input (xtl ) quantities as well as output (ptm) and
input prices (wtl ). While profit change can be decomposed into the quantity and price
effects detailed in Eq. 2 with this information alone, the further decomposition detailed
in Sect. 3 requires the revelation of unobserved output and input quantities with the
non-parametric model detailed in Sect. 4.
3 By definition, with this assumption the overall estimated individual profit change for a merged firm and
its predecessor companies is equivalent to the change observed between the profit of the successor firm
and the total profit of the predecessor firms. Moreover, as only 8 mergers appear in the sample of 228
individual profit change decompositions underlying our aggregate results, we must make this assumption
for only a limited number of observations. However, while total profit change is not affected, we note that
there does exist a theoretical potential for bias in the decomposition of profit change for the 8 individual
profit change decompositions spanning a merger event, due to possible misspecification of the relevant
frontier for the merged firm. However, sensitivity analysis shows that relative to firm size, the individual
profit decompositions for the 8 potentially biased merger observations are in line with the individual profit
decompositions for the 220 unbiased companies.
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In our specification of total economic costs, we allow for capital (xtK ), labor (xtL )
and ‘other’ (xtO ) inputs, and the corresponding input prices wtK , wtL , and wtO . Labor
costs are observed in the annual accounts, as are the number of full time equivalent
employees, which we employ as our proxy for xtL . w
t
L is then calculated as labor costs
divided by xtL . Other costs is calculated by subtracting labor costs from total operat-
ing expenditures, as observed in the annual accounts. As it is the best available price
proxy for other costs in the Dutch water industry, we proxy wtO with the (material)
construction price index as annually published by the Dutch Office for Statistics. The
proxy for other input usage (xtO ) is then computed by dividing other costs by wtO . 4
The economic (opportunity) cost of capital is estimated as the sum of depreciation
(from the annual accounts) and an estimated opportunity cost of capital. The latter is
computed by multiplying the book value of assets by the opportunity cost of capital,
which we estimate as the yield on the risk free 10 year Dutch government bond plus a
risk premium of 4%.5 Our estimate of wtK is then calculated by dividing the estimated
economic cost of capital by mains length, which serves as our physical proxy for xtK .
Total revenues are drawn from the companies’ annual accounts, but we have limited
the number of output variables to two in order to avoid difficulties with the degrees of
freedom in the non-parametric model. We opted for two consensual output variables
related to production, i.e., water production for domestic (ytD) and non-domestic (ytN )
customers. However, robustness tests with outputs based on different partitions of total
water production or the number of water connections (both aggregated and divided
into domestic and non-domestic customers) delivered similar results. Output prices
are deduced from Vewin’s annual Water Supply Statistics report and are equivalent to
the average price paid per cubic meter of water by domestic (ptD) and non-domestic
customers (ptN ). Aggregate statistics for our sample are provided in Table 1.
To account for heterogeneity in the data, we estimate the robust and conditional
efficiency measures detailed in Sect. 4, using population density (computed by number
of connections per kilometer of network length) as our environmental conditioning
variable (zti ). Population density is widely considered to be an important determinant
of water utility input requirements, because the relatively smaller input requirements
associated with distributing water in more densely populated areas result in econo-
mies of network density (see Filippini et al. 2008). It is therefore appropriate to con-
dition efficiency scores on population density, as otherwise the relatively high input
requirements of utilities operating with low population density would be inappropri-
ately modelled as inefficiency. Sensitivity analysis of our profit decomposition without
accounting for the exogenous environment (i.e., the regular deterministic DEA model
or the order-m model) confirm this potential bias. Moreover, we would also argue that
such unconditional DEA models would result in potentially biased estimates of the
4 While it would be desirable to further decompose other costs into components such as energy costs,
chemicals, and contracted out services, the necessary data to allow this are not available.
5 A 4% risk premium follows the literature (Brigham et al. 1985) and expert views in the Dutch water
sector. As total economic costs are influenced by the risk premium, a 4% risk premium corresponds to a
favorable assumption for drinking water utilities. This is because it gives them the benefit of the doubt,
particularly at the end of the sample period when economic profits in the industry are found to be relatively
high. Thus, alternative models with lower assumed risk premiums result in lower total economic costs and
hence even greater economic profits than those reported here.
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Table 2 Cumulative effect (real 1995 euro, millions)
1992–1997 1997–2006 1997–2000 2000–2003 2003–2006
Profit change 237.1 94.6 28.9 27.0 38.7
Quantity effect −76.6 40.4 15.5 40.5 −15.7
Productivity −100.9 227.9 78.2 65.9 83.7
Technical change 12.3 214.0 22.7 113.9 77.3
Efficiency change −113.1 13.9 55.5 −48.0 6.4
Activity effect 24.3 −187.5 −62.7 −25.4 −99.4
Product mix 22.0 17.6 −31.3 52.4 −3.5
Resource mix 0.7 −254.3 −55.8 −65.4 −133.1
Scale effect 1.5 49.2 24.4 −12.4 37.2
Price effect 313.7 54.2 13.4 −13.6 54.4
Input price effect 29.5 158.1 −31.1 86.5 102.7
Capital 49.1 183.2 −1.5 96.7 88.0
Labour −25.2 −17.4 −29.6 −17.0 29.2
Other inputs 5.6 −7.7 0.01 6.8 −14.5
Output price effect 284.1 −103.9 44.5 −100.1 −48.4
Domestic consumers 185.2 −43.1 25.3 −39.2 −29.1
Non-domestic consumers 99.0 −60.9 19.2 −60.9 −19.2
activity effect, which relies on the estimation of efficient input and output quantities
that are, in practice, heavily influenced by environmental factors such as population
density.6
Given space limitations, Table 2 reports, in aggregate for our entire sample, the
cumulative change in profits and its decomposition, for the 1992–1997 period before
sunshine regulation was introduced and the entire sunshine regulation period. More-
over, given the regulatory periods discussed in Sect. 2, Table 2 also reports cumulative
profit change and its decomposition for the 1997–2000, 2000–2003, and 2003–2006
periods.7
5.1 The pre-sunshine period: 1992–1997
In the period before the introduction of sunshine regulation our estimates suggest a
dramatic change in economic profitability. Thus, between 1992 and 1997 economic
losses of −97.6 million euros were eliminated and replaced with significant economic
profits amounting to 139.5 million euros. As Table 2 clearly illustrates, 132% of this
237.1 million euro increase in profitability was realized because of changes in out-
6 Stated differently, the activity effect decompositions are particularly worrisome if one fails to allow for
the operational environment: by comparing ‘apples with oranges’ in a non-conditional efficiency framework
the decomposition may erroneously assign heterogeneity to the scale, product mix, or output mix effect,
rather than properly allowing for legitimate differences in input requirements associated with increased or
reduced population density.
7 Estimates of year-by-year changes are available from the authors upon request.
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put and input prices that benefited the companies. More specifically, output prices
increased substantially for both domestic and non-domestic consumers, contribut-
ing 284.1 million euros to increased profits. In aggregate, reduced input prices also
contributed 29.5 million euros to profit change, although substantial contributions to
profitability from reductions in the price of capital and other inputs, were offset by
increases in the price of labor.
In contrast to the overall positive impact of the price effect on profits, the cumulative
impact of the quantity effect between 1992 and 1997 resulted in a 76.6 million euro
reduction in profits. This negative effect can be entirely attributed to the negative pro-
ductivity effect which decreased profits by 100.9 million euros. Moreover, the entire
negative productivity effect can be attributed to reduced efficiency (−113.1 million
euros), given the small positive contribution attributable to technical change (12.3
million euros). The activity effect is also notable during this period, as it is not only
small, but almost exclusively attributed to changes in product mix as a small decline
of non-domestic consumption, coupled with growth in domestic consumption led to
relatively more production for domestic consumers, thereby contributing to profit-
ability. However, on balance there is little to no evidence that structural changes, as
captured by changes in the mix of inputs, outputs or scale, were influencing aggregate
profitability substantially before 1997.
Thus, while profits clearly increased because of price increases to consumers, there
is substantial contradictory evidence to suggest that economic performance, as mea-
sured by the quantity effect, and more specifically efficiency, actually declined during
the period before sunshine regulation was implemented. It seems that the absence of
any effective mechanism to incentivize improved performance resulted in dramatically
reduced performance as managers did not face any effective pressure to reduce costs.
This result mirrors the findings of Saal and Parker (2000, 2001) who found that privati-
sation did not improve performance in the English and Welsh water sector until a more
effective incentive regime was implemented in 1995. It also confirms previous research
on the Dutch water sector (De Witte and Dijkgraaf 2008; Dijkgraaf et al. 2007a).
5.2 The post sunshine period: 1997–2006
Our results suggest that the introduction of the sunshine regulatory model in 1997 sub-
stantially altered aggregate profit performance and its determinants. Focusing first on
aggregate profit change, we see that for the entire 1997–2006 period, profits increased
by only 94.6 million euros, which was the result of roughly equal aggregate profit
increases for each of the 1997–2000, 2000–2003, and 2003–2006 periods. Relative to
the pre sunshine period, profit growth was therefore relatively slow. However, while
the small positive price effect of 54.2 million euros for this period is also relatively
small, delving deeper reveals that lower real output prices reduced profits by 103.9 mil-
lion euros and lower input prices contributed a positive effect of 158.1 million euros.
Thus, in sharp contrast to pre 1997 experience, between 1997 and 2006 positive profit
growth was achieved despite considerable reductions in output prices, and was aided
by reductions in real input prices. However, it is noteworthy that a disproportionate
share of the benefits from output price reductions accrued to non-domestic consumers.
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The large positive 227.9 million euro contribution to profits attributable to produc-
tivity change between 1997 and 2006 similarly contrasts to the negative productivity
effect experienced before the introduction of sunshine regulation, thereby suggesting
a considerable shift in the productive performance of the water utilities. Moreover, this
change was sustained in each of the 1997–2000, 2000–2003, and 2003–2006 periods.
However, 93% of the contribution of productivity growth is attributable to technical
change (214.0 million euros), which was similarly sustained over the entire period. In
contrast, while the considerable efficiency loss of the pre 1997 period was replaced
by positive efficiency change contributing 13.9 million to profits between 1997 and
2006, its contribution to overall productivity growth and profitability was both small
and erratic, as evidenced by the −48.0 million euro contribution of efficiency change
to profits between 2000 and 2003. On balance however, these results suggest that after
1997 Dutch drinking water utilities operated in an environment in which profit change
was primarily driven by productivity improvements, and consumers appear to have
eventually received a substantial portion of the resulting cost reductions in reduced
output prices.
However, it is worthwhile to note that while a clear shift in underlying productivity
performance is evident from the introduction of sunshine regulation in 1997, the pattern
of the output price, quantity, and productivity effects suggest that consumer benefits, as
well as underlying performance improvements, were most evident after 2000, and par-
ticularly in the 2000–2003 period. As benefits to consumers in reduced output prices
are concentrated in the 2000–2003 and 2003–2006 periods, we would again note a
parallel with the case of the English and Welsh water sector, where a similar pattern of
performance improvements preceding consumer benefits is evident and accepted on
the grounds that firms must retain the benefits of performance improvements for some
period of time in order to provide appropriate incentives. The increasing focus in the
Dutch media and in Dutch academic journals on excessive profits in the water industry
during this period clearly suggests that the water utilities and/or politicians responded
to public opinion with large output price declines. Nevertheless, while output price
reductions led to a 148.5 million euro reduction in economic profits between 2000 and
2006, economic profits actually increased from 168.4 to 234.1 million euros over the
same period, thereby suggesting that productivity incentives were not dampened by
the onset of output price reductions.
We would finally note that as the potential establishment of an independent reg-
ulator was debated during the 2000–2003 period it is plausible that the industry
increased its performance under sunshine regulation during this period precisely
because it sought to avoid the implementation of a more robust incentive regu-
lation system, and not because sunshine regulation itself enhanced performance.
However, while this is plausible, periodic in earnest discussion of the possible estab-
lishment of an independent regulator, cannot explain the continuing shift to positive
productivity change in every year after 1997 when sunshine regulation was intro-
duced. Moreover, we would also argue, that if the mere threat of movement to an
alternative regulatory system from the preferred sunshine regulatory model is suf-
ficient to substantially improve company performance, this threat is always avail-
able to policy makers wishing to maintain the effectiveness of a sunshine regulation
system.
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Nevertheless, our models do suggest some substantial negative evidence with regard
to underlying company performance, as over 1997–2006 the activity effect resulted in
a substantial negative profit change amounting to 187.5 million euros, thereby reduc-
ing the overall quantity effect to only 40.4 million euros. However, closer inspection
of Table 2 reveals that in aggregate, this negative effect is driven by the resource mix
effect (contributing −254.3 million euros to profits) which counteracted a relatively
small positive scale effect (49.2 million euros) and the product mix effect (17.6 million
euros), with the latter only being positive during 2000–2003. The scale effect result
suggests that while on balance economic costs were reduced through increased scale
(i.e., the many mergers), the magnitude of these benefits is quite small in compar-
ison to productivity improvements. Nevertheless, these results are in line with Van
Damme and Mulder (2006), who observe that companies exploit their larger scale to
increase profits. The product mix effect contributes positively to profits, suggesting
that changes in output mix have contributed to increased profitability. Indeed, from
the underlying data we observe that, production for large customers decreased over
time, production for small customers increased significantly, and price reductions for
large customers have far outweighed those for small customers since 2000.
We believe the substantial negative resource mix effect captures the impact of
efforts to increase security of supply, which have accompanied water mergers in the
Netherlands. Indeed, when two utilities are merged, subsequent dramatic increases in
the length of mains (i.e., capital) are generally observed, and justified as necessary to
increase water supply security by allowing transfer of water resources between previ-
ously physically separated networks. This has resulted in a 27.3% increase in mains
length between 1997 and 2006, while total water production has only increased by
9.3% (as calculated from the sample aggregate data in Table 1).8 Although, increasing
network length aims to increase the security of supply, it also has a direct negative
impact on profits, which has been captured by the resource mix effect. In other words,
the negative resource mix effect suggests that the net impact of the industry’s move to a
less labor intensive but more capital and other input intensive structure, has resulted in
increased costs of production. This is not contradictory to the finding of positive tech-
nical change, which implies that the industry is using a more productive technology,
and to the positive efficiency effect, which implies that inefficient firms have elimi-
nated technical efficiency. Stated differently, while the industry has seen substantial
productivity improvements because it has reduced its input usage relative to outputs,
its restructuring efforts have also, unfortunately, resulted in higher than economically
efficient costs because of an increasing misalignment between input prices and the
marginal rate of technical substitution between inputs. While increased security of
supply may or may not justify the resulting increase in economic costs, it is simply
beyond the scope of this study to determine the benefit of this unpriced and difficult
to measure ‘output’.
8 As this increase in water supply security cannot be measured and is therefore not included as an output
in the model, this could potentially result in an overstatement of the negative resource mix effect. We would
also note that as the expansion of the mains network is certainly designed to allow for future demand, the
substantial capital investment programme pursued in the past 15 years could result in ‘excessive’ capital
usage, which is nonetheless appropriate if we allow for potential future demand expansion.
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Overall, our profit decomposition results suggest that, subsequent to the introduc-
tion of light-handed sunshine regulation in 1997, the determinants of profit change
in the Dutch drinking water sector have dramatically altered. Thus, despite some
potential qualms created by the large negative resource mix effect and its suggestion
that efforts to increase security of supply have substantially driven up economic costs
in the industry, on balance, our results are consistent with the conclusion that the Dutch
voluntary regulatory model has improved performance in the industry. In particular,
our results suggest that Dutch water utilities have not only achieved substantial pro-
ductivity improvements since 1997, but have also begun to pass these benefits back
to consumers in reduced output prices. Nevertheless, given continuing substantial and
increasing economic profits at the end of our sample period, our results also suggest
that public concern with excessive profits may be justified, and that further output
price reductions would bring revenues better in line with actual economic costs in the
industry.
6 Summary and conclusions
In 1997, after pressure created by debate on the potential privatization of the regional
water utilities, the publicly owned Dutch drinking water sector implemented a self-
regulatory incentive scheme based on sunshine regulation (i.e., benchmarking with
naming and shaming, but with no mandatory price regulation). In order to analyse
the impact of this scheme on water industry performance, this paper has decomposed
the sources of water utility profit change in the periods before and after sunshine reg-
ulation’s introduction. To do so, it extends the decompositions of Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell (1999, 2008) by employing an advanced DEA model which allows for both
atypical observations (resulting from the mergers and measurement errors) and het-
erogeneity in the data (Daraio and Simar 2007). The latter is particularly important
as we need to control for differences in operating environment if we wish to properly
measure efficient input requirements and thereby properly decompose the sources of
profitability.
Analyzing the sources of profit change in the Dutch water sector suggests that the
introduction of sunshine regulation appears to be associated with not only improved
productivity in the industry, but also insuring that these productivity gains have begun
to be passed to water consumers through reduced output prices. Thus, before the
introduction of sunshine regulation in 1997, economic losses were transformed into
economic profits by a substantial increase in output prices faced by consumers. More-
over, in this initial period there was also a substantial decline in the overall productiv-
ity of water utilities. In contrast, our results suggest that since 1997, the naming and
shaming technique of sunshine regulation has resulted in substantial increases in pro-
ductivity that are primarily attributable to technical change, and moderate reductions
in real output prices, particularly after 2000, that returned a small proportion of these
productivity gains to water consumers. Moreover, as economic profits, nonetheless
increased between 2000 and 2006, our results suggest that these output price reduc-
tions did not accrue from political interference in favor of consumers, but were instead
the result of passing past productivity improvements from producers to consumers.
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The model of sunshine regulation adopted in the Netherlands has therefore produced
results that are broadly consistent with the goals of more formal incentive regimes in
that the underlying productivity of the industry appears to have been improved, and
a proportion of these productivity improvements are beginning to be transferred to
consumers in reduced output prices.
Nevertheless, substantial and sustained economic profits in the Dutch water industry
highlight a potential weakness of sunshine regulation in the long run. Stated differ-
ently, it would appear that the focus in the Dutch water industry has been primarily on
improving the productive efficiency of the utilities, and improving security of supply,
while a careful consideration suggests that relatively little attention has been given to
the issue of improving allocative efficiency by more closely aligning water prices with
the economic cost of water. Given that Dutch regional governments are the ultimate
beneficiaries of water utility profitability, continued economic profits in the indus-
try can also be seen as a tax whose incidence increases with water consumption, and
which is transferred to consumers of government services. Moreover, while the contin-
uation of the small declines in average real water prices for domestic and non-domestic
consumers that have occurred since 2000 will apparently assuage public opinion, the
absence of public discord does not eliminate the allocative inefficiencies caused by
inappropriately high water prices.
On balance, the current implicit tax on water consumers may be an acceptable long
term political solution in the Dutch context, and the sunshine regulatory model may
therefore continue to be employed. Nevertheless, the Dutch experience still suggests
that even under public ownership there may be inadequate mechanisms within the
sunshine regulation model to guarantee a closer alignment between water prices and
economic costs in the long run. This is because even with sustained public focus on
excess profits since at least 2000, the sunshine regime has only delivered a moderate
reduction in output prices and the ultimate retention of substantial economic prof-
its. Thus, while sunshine regulation appears to have provided sufficient incentives
to improve productivity in the industry, and moderately rebalance tariffs in favor of
consumers, it is likely that achieving closer alignment between water prices and eco-
nomic costs, would require the establishment of a more formal regulatory framework,
in which prices were set so as to better reflect economic costs (see, e.g., Maziotis et
al. 2009).
In sum, while our results suggest that the sunshine regulatory framework has been
an effective tool in the publicly owned Dutch water sector, the challenge of both main-
taining long run incentives for productivity growth, and achieving a more appropriate
alignment between economic costs and water prices is a substantial issue that will need
to be addressed before it can be considered a fully viable alternative regulatory model.
We therefore conclude by emphasizing that, sunshine regulation has achieved much in
the Netherlands, but there remain three issues. Firstly, the regime in its current format
could only be judged to be acceptable in situations where public ownership has been
deemed to be a political necessity. Secondly, sunshine regulation requires sufficient
public interest to provide the substantial oversight that forces managers to improve
performance. Finally, policy makers should be willing to accept the potential misalign-
ment of water prices and costs and the subsequent implicit tax on water consumers
that this implies.
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